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The Place of the "Minimum Core Approach"
in the Realisation of the Entrenched




The high levels of poverty, inequality and socio-economic marginalisation that
bedevilled Kenya for generations led to a struggle for a new constitutional
dispensation, which culminated in the promulgation of a new, egalitarian and trans-
formative constitution in August 2010. This constitution entrenched justiciable
socio-economic rights within an elaborate Bill of Rights. Though an important
step in the process of the egalitarian transformation of the country, the challenge
remains to transform these precepts into practice with their scrupulous implementa-
tion through legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks, as well as judicial
decision-making. This article argues that, in order to achieve the intended egalitar-
ian transformation, Kenya must adopt a strong interpretive approach, with sufficient
foundational standards for the translation of these rights into tangible realities for
Kenyans. Kenya must therefore explicitly adopt a minimum core approach for the
realisation of these rights to transform them into practical realities for the poor,
vulnerable and marginalised Kenyans.
INTRODUCTION
High levels of poverty, inequality and the socio-economic marginalization of
the majority of the Kenyan people have been major challenges to the achieve-
ment of sustainable development in Kenya. The poverty level in Kenya is
among the world's highest, with approximately 46-56 per cent of the popula-
tion living below the poverty line,' showing no real improvement from the
Lecturer, School of Law, University of Nairobi, Kenya.
1 Government of Kenya "Poverty reduction strategy paper First medium term plan 2008-
2012" (submitted to the International Monetary Fund) at ii, available at: <http://www.
imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2010/crlO224.pdf> (last accessed 8 June 2013). However,
many commentators have argued that the actual percentage of people living below
the poverty line is higher than government estimates, with the percentage placed at
56-65% and rising. See: Foundation for Sustainable Development "Kenya: A develo
pment overview", para 4, available at: <http://www.fsdintemational.org/country/kenya/
devissues> (last accessed 8 June 2013); J Kiringai et al "Feminisation of poverty in
Kenya: Is fiscal policy the panacea or Achilles' heel?" (paper presented during the
5th PEP Research Network general meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18-22 June
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officially estimated poverty rate of 48 per cent in 1981.2 According to data
from the International Fund for Agriculture and Development, the overall
poverty situation is worsening, rather than improving as is the trend in
other developed and developing states, with estimates that, since the
post-election crisis of 2008, the poverty headcount has increased by
22 per cent and the measure of severe poverty has gone up by a startling 38
per cent.3 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Human
Development Index (HDI, which measures development in terms of life
expectancy, educational attainment and standards of living) has consistently
ranked Kenya as a low human development country. In 2013, Kenya was
145th among the 186 ranked countries of the world,4 showing a slight
human development regression from its previous position of 143 out of 187
countries in 20115 and 128 out of 169 in 2010.6
Poverty and socio-economic marginalization have been exacerbated in the
recent past by the explosion of ethnic violence following: the bungling of the
2007 presidential elections;7 rampant and runaway corruption that has debilitated
contd
2006), available at: <http://www.pep-netorg/sites/pep-net.org/flles/typo3doc/pdf/files-
events/5thethiopia/Kiringai.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
2 See The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit "Kenya poverty and
inequality assessment: Synthesis report" (Africa region report, June 2008) at ii, available at
<http://siteresources.worldbankorg/INTAFRREGTOPGENDER/Resources/PAKENYA.pdf> (Last
accessed 13 June 2015).
3 See International Fund for Agriculture and Development "Kenya: Programme for ural out-
reach of financial innovations and technologies (PROFIT) programme design report" (May
2010) vol 1 at 5, available at: <http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/design/100/kenya.
pdf> (last accessed 8 June 2013).
4 UNDP "The rise of the South: Human progress in a diverse world" (Human Development
Report 2013) at 146, available at- <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/
hdr2013en-complete.pdf> (last accessed 18 May 2015).
5 UNDP "Sustainability and equity: A better future for all" (Human Development Report
2011) at 126, available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/271/hdr
2011_en complete.pdf> (last accessed 18 May 2015).
6 UNDP Human Development Report 2010 "The real wealth of nations: Pathways to human
development" (2010) at 143-46, available at <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/
reports/270/hdr_- 2010_- en completejreprint.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015). In the
explanatory notes to the 2014 indicators for Kenya, UNDP contends that the ranking
for Kenya in the 2013 HDI is 147 out of 187 countries, a deterioration of two ranks; see
UNDP "Sustaining human progress: Reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience -
Explanatory note to the 2014 HDR composite indices - Kenya" at 2, available at. <http://
hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr-theme/country-notes/KEN.pdf> (last accessed 13 June
2015).
7 The Committee on the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD Committee) has noted that ethnic tensions and continued ethnic violence are due
to the failure by the state to address ethnic and regional disparities in the enjoyment of
economic and social rights, leading to resentment. The committee has therefore urged
the state to enhance resource allocation to address disparities in access to socio-
economic goods and services, especially in historically marginalized areas and commu-
ninties. This should be aimed at the reduction of inequality through employment and
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the government's resource capacity to provide basic services; climate change
which has led to increased drought, crop failure and an exponential increase in
the prices of basic commodities;8 international forces of globalization; skewed
international trade; and the international economic downturn of 2008-09.9
Inequality, which is intricately linked to poverty and socio-economic mar-
ginalization, has also been a major challenge in achieving the objective of
making Kenya a middle-income economy. Despite evidenced economic
growth in the recent past,10 inequality" is still highly entrenched in Kenyan
political, economic, social and cultural spheres, with Kenya ranking among
the most unequal countries in the world.12 In Kenya, inequality and deep
human development disparities exist between rich and poor people, men
and women, rural and urban areas, uptown and informal settlements, and
between different regions and groups. The high inequality is intricately linked
to the skewed distribution of state resources among different geographical
areas and different communities in Kenya, leading to increased exclusion
and marginalization. Inequality is manifested by huge disparities in income,
lack of equal access to productive assets, social and political exclusion, and
the inability of certain groups in society to access key social services.
13
The World Bank's World Development Indicators 2011 indicate that
inequality in Kenya is so high that, in the African region, it only compares
favourably with that in South Africa, a country that had suffered many years
of apartheid. The inequality Gini coefficient index14 for Kenya is 48 per
contd
education, and this effort should be anchored in the state's poverty reduction policies
and strategies. See CERD Committee "Concluding observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Kenya" (CERD/C/KEN/CO/1-4, September
2011), para 23, available at: <http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyextemal/
Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/KEN/CO/1-4&Lang=En> (last accessed 13 June
2015).
8 See M Barasa "Rural poverty in Kenya" (2007) Contemporary Review 289 at 294-95.
9 CS Adam et al Kenya: Policies for Prosperity (2010) at 1.
10 UNDP indicators show that Kenya's gross national income per capita increased by about
11% between 1980 and 2011; see UNDP "Sustainability and equity", above at note 5 at 2.
11 According to Society for International Development "Pulling apart: Facts and figures on
inequality in Kenya" (popular version, 2004) at 1, available at: <http://www.sidint.
net/docs/pullingapart-mini.pdf> (last accessed 8 June 2013), inequality is: "The degree
to which distribution of economic welfare generated in an economy differs from that
of equal shares among its inhabitants ... It is observed not only in incomes but also
in terms of social exclusion and the inability to access social services and socio-political
rights by different population groups, genders and even races."
12 Tegemeo Institute Agricultural Policy and Development, Egerton University "Rural
incomes, inequality and poverty dynamics in Kenya" (2009) at 2, available at: <http://
www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/Working%2papers/Tegemeo-WP30-Rural-incomes-
inequality-povertydynanics-Kenya.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
13 Id at4.
14 The Gini coefficient varies within a range of 0 to 1, with 0 indicating perfect equality
between households, while 1 indicates perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient of most
African countries ranges from about 0.40 to 0.50, while most developed countries
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cent, as compared to 57.8 per cent for South Africa, 37.6 per cent for Tanzania
and 29.8 per cent for Ethiopia.15 These dire inequality indicators are con-
firmed by the World Bank's poverty and inequality assessment report,
which indicates that the ratio of consumption between the top and bottom
10 per cent of the Kenyan population stood at 20:1 in urban areas and 12:1
in rural areas. This compares adversely with the ratio of consumption in
Tanzania that stood at 5:1 and that in Ethiopia, which stood at 3.3:1.16
The rampant poverty, inequality and political as well as socio-economic
marginalization discussed above were the major drivers for a new political
and socio-economic dispensation, which culminated in the promulgation in
August 2010 of a new transformative constitution (the 2010 Constitution).
The High Court of Kenya captured this starkly in the case of Satrose Ayuma
as follows: "[tihe crave for the new Constitution in this country was driven
by people's expectations of better lives in every aspect, improvement of
their living standards and just treatment that guarantees them human dig-
nity, freedom and a measure of equality."
17
Entrenched, justiciable socio-economic rights (SERs) constitute one of
the major tools in the 2010 Constitution aimed at reducing poverty
and enhancing socio-economic equality.18 The main provisions on SERs
in the 2010 Constitution are contained in the articles 21(2),19 43,20
contd
have a coefficient ranging from 0.20 to 0.30, indicating that developed countries have
less inequality than developing countries. See id at 8. Oxfam Great Britain indicates
that the Gini coefficient for rural areas in Kenya is 0.38, while that of Nairobi is a stagger-
ing 0.59, indicating similar inequality levels to those in Johannesburg (South Africa) in
the mid-1990s; see Oxfam Great Britain "Urban poverty and vulnerability in Kenya:
Background analysis for the preparation of an Oxfam GB urban programme focused
on Nairobi" (September 2009) at 3, available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/Urban-
Poverty-andVulnerability-in Kenya.pdf> (last accessed 8 June 2013).
15 World Bank "World development indicators 2011" (April 2011) at 67-70, available at:
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-O-8213-8709-2> (last accessed 21
May 2015).
16 See World Bank "Kenya poverty and inequality assessment", above at note 2 at 3.
17 Satrose Ayuma and 11 Others v The Attorney General and 2 Others High Court petition no 65
of 2010 at 22.
18 The justiciability of the SERs in the constitution is affinmed by:. their entrenchment as an
integral part of the Bill of Rights; the constitutional empowerment of a wide array of par-
ties to access courts in instances of the violation, infringement, denial or threatened
infringement of these rights as per art 22; and the constitutional conferment ofjurisdic-
tion on the Kenyan courts to hear and determine applications for the violation of rights
and to redress such violations through the adoption of effective remedies, as per art 23
read with art 165 of the constitution.
19 Art 21 deals with the implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms and sub-
art (2) requires the state to "take legislative, policy and other measures, including the set-
ting of standards, to achieve the progressive realisation of the rights guaranteed under
article 43".
20 Art 43 is entitled "Economic and social rights" and provides in art 43(1) that "Every per-
son has the right - (a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the
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53(1)(a)21 and (b);22 they encapsulate the major SERs that have been entrenched
in international and regional human rights instruments, as well as in the con-
stitutions of countries that have entrenched SERs.23 The 2010 Constitution
also acknowledges the importance of work / labour in the realisation of
improved standards of living, and thus the transformation of the socio-
economic conditions of individuals and families, in the constitution's
espousal of an extensive array of labour relations rights, such as rights to
fair labour practices, fair remuneration, fair working conditions, formation
of, and participation in, trade unions, as well as the right to strike. 24
These constitutionally entrenched SERs are complemented and buttressed
by the constitutional incorporation of SERs in international and regional
legal instruments through article 2(6) of the 2010 Constitution, which pro-
vides that "[ajny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of
the law of Kenya under this Constitution."25 The Kenyan courts have affirmed
the direct incorporation of international human rights law into the Kenyan
domestic legal system via article 2(6) in several judgments,26 including in
the Supreme Court where the chief justice, in a dissenting opinion, held
that "[the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW)] applies through the operation of article 2(6) of
the Constitution of Kenya, having been acceded to by Kenya on 9th March
contd
right to healthcare services, including reproductive health; (b) to accessible and adequate
housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; (c) to be free from hunger, and to
have adequate food of acceptable quality-, (d) to clean and safe water in adequate quan-
tities; (e) to social security, and (f) to education." Art 43(2) prohibits the denial of emer-
gency medical treatment and art 43(3) requires the state to provide social security to
persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependants.
21 Every child's right to free and compulsory education.
22 Every child's right to basic nutrition, shelter and healthcare.
23 See the 1996 South African Constitution, secs 26, 27 and 28.
24 The 2010 Constitution, art 41.
25 A complete analysis of art 2(6) is beyond the scope of this article, but the author has dealt
with this issue elsewhere; see N Orago "The 2010 Kenyan Constitution and the hierarch-
ical place of international law in the Kenyan domestic legal system: A comparative per-
spective" (2013) 13 African Human Rights Law Journal 415.
26 Among others: John Kabui Mwai and 3 Others v Kenya National Examination Council and 2
Others High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, pet no 15 of 2011 at 6 ("Under article 2(6) of the
constitution the convention forms part of our laws"); Okwanda v The Minister of Health
and Medical Services and 3 Others High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, pet no 94 of 2012,
para 12 ("Apart from constitutional provisions governing economic and social rights,
art 2(6) provides that treaties and conventions ratified by Kenya shall form part of the
law of Kenya"); Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General and 2 others Nairobi pet no
164 of 2011 at 15 ("Article 2(5) and (6) of the constitution make the general rules of inter-
national law and any treaty or convention that Kenya has ratified part of the law of
Kenya. Consequently, the state, state organs and all persons, in carrying out evictions,
should do so in accordance with the United Nations Guidelines on Evictions").
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1984".27 Some of the international legal instruments providing for SERs that
have been ratified by Kenya include: the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),28 the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC),29 CEDAW,30 the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities,31 the relevant International Labour Organisation
(ILO) conventions,32 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(African Charter)33 and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,34 and
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.35 These inter-
national legal instruments do not only form an important source of norms
for the Kenyan courts, they also form an important guide in the interpretation
and application of the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Constitution. This was
27 In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation i the National Assembly and the Senate
Supreme Court of Kenya, advisory opinion, appln 2 of 2012, dissenting advisory opinion
of Chief Justice Willy Mutumga, para 11.1.
28 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA res 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, assented to by Kenya 1 May 1972,
available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx> (last
accessed 13 June 2015).
29 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA res 44/25 of 20
November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with art 49.
Ratified by Kenya 30 July 1990. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professional
interest/pages/crc.aspx> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
30 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions 18 December 1979,
entered into force 3 September 1981, assented to by Kenya 9 March 1984, available at:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx> (last accessed 13
June 2015).
31 Adopted by GA res A/RES/61/106, 24 January 2007, signed by Kenya 30 March 2007 and
ratified 19 May 2008, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f973632.
html> (last accessed 8 May 2013).
32 Kenya has ratified 49 ILO conventions, 43 of which are in force and 6 have been
denounced. Some of the conventions in force include: The Forced Labour Convention,
1930 (No 29); The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No
98); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No 100); Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, 1957 (No 105); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
1958 (No 111); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No 138); and Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention, 1999 (No 182). For full ratification information, see: <http://www.
io.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200 COUNTRYID:103315>
(last accessed 13 June 2015).
33 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accessions 1 June 1981, entered into
force 21 October 1986, ratified by Kenya 23 January 1992, available at: <http://www.au.
int/en/sites/default/files/banjulcharter.pdf> (last accessed 21 May 2015).
34 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 1 July 2003, entered into
force 25 November 2005, ratified by Kenya 6 October 2010, available at: <http://www.
au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20the%2Rights%20of%2OWomen.pdf>
(last accessed 21 May 2015).
35 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 1 July 1990, entered into
force 29 November 1999, ratified by Kenya 25 July 2000, available at: <http://www.au.
int/en/sites/default/files/Charter EnAfricanCharter on theRights-andWlefare of
theChildAddisAbaba.Juy1990.pdf> (last accessed 21 May 2015).
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affirmed by the Kenyan Supreme Court in an advisory opinion that "[iut is
clear to us that the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 which generously adopts
such language of the international human rights instruments, draws inspir-
ation from them".
36
The entrenched SERs entail a continuum of obligations on the state, con-
tained in article 21 of the 2010 Constitution, which provides that "[iut is a fun-
damental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of
Rights".37 This typology of obligations arising in the context of SER litigation
was affimed and elaborated as follows by the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) in the case of SERAC and
Another v Nigeria: "[i]nternationally accepted ideas of the various obligations
engendered by human rights indicate that all rights - both [civil and political
rights] and [SERs] - generate at least four levels of duties for a State that under-
takes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, pro-
mote, and fulfil these rights. These obligations universally apply to all rights
and entail a combination of negative and positive duties." 38
Due to the similarities in the wording of the obligations, Kenyan courts
should seek guidance from international, regional and comparative foreign
national jurisprudence in interpreting these SERs obligations.39
The importance of SERs in the egalitarian transformation of Kenyan society
was acknowledged as follows by the Kenyan High Court in John Kabui Mwai and
Others v The Attorney General and 2 Others (Kabui Mwai):
"In our view, the inclusion of [SERs] in the Constitution is aimed at advancing
the socio-economic needs of the people of Kenya, including those who are
poor, in order to uplift their human dignity. The protection of these rights
is an indication of the fact that the Constitution's transformative agenda
looks beyond merely guaranteeing abstract equality. There is a commitment
to transform Kenya from a society based on socio-economic deprivation to
36 The Principle of Gender Representation, above at note 27, para 52.
37 2010 Constitution, art 21(1). For an elaboration of the content of these obligations in
relation to the SERs in the Kenyan Constitution, see Mitu-Bell Welfare Society, above at
note 26 at 22-23.
38 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR)
2001, paras 44-47.
39 For an elaboration of these obligations at the international level using the tripartite typ-
ology, see A Eide "The human right to adequate food and freedom from hunger" (final
report prepared for the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23,
available at: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/W9990E/w999oeO3.htm> (last accessed 2 July,
2013); A Eide "Economic, social and cultural rights as human rights" in A Eide, C
Krause and A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2001, Martinus
Nijjhofo 9 at 22-28; D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007, Oxford University Press) at 184 and 195-96;
MCR Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A
Perspective on its Development (1998, Clarendon Press) from 330, among others.
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one based on equal and equitable distribution of resources. This is borne out
by Articles 6(3) and 10(2)(b). The realisation of socio-economic rights means the
realisation of the conditions of the poor and less advantaged and the begin-
ning of a generation that is free from socio-economic need.' 4°
Therefore, the objective of the entrenchment of justiciable SERs in the 2010
Constitution, similar to that of other national jurisdictions that have
entrenched such rights in their constitutions, is to facilitate the eradication
of poverty and inequality, improve the overall standards of living of all people
and ensure social justice.41 To achieve these objectives, a strong normative
interpretive approach, with sufficient foundational standards and tests for
the translation of abstract SER norms into tangible realities for the
rights-holders, is crucial.42 This article proposes that the realisation of these
goals in essence necessitates that, apart from the duty to realise SERs progres-
sively, Kenya must explicitly adopt a minimum core approach to realising the
entrenched SERs, an approach which requires the state, at the very least, to
provide the most vulnerable of its citizens with the minimum essential levels
of the entrenched SERs.
43
40 Kabui Mwai, above at note 26 at 6.
41 Z Yacoob "The entrenchment and enforcement of socio-economic rights" (paper pre-
sented at the judges' conference to mark the inauguration of the new South African
Constitutional Court building, 18-20 March 2004) at 3, available at: <http://
housin justice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/the-entrenchment-and-enforcement-f-
socio-economic-rights.pdf> (last accessed 27 January 2013).
42 J Chowdhury "Judicial adherence to a minimum core approach to socio-economic
rights: A comparative perspective" (paper presented at the fifth inter-university graduate
student conference, Cornell Law School, March 2009) at 2, available at: <http://
scholarship.law.comell.edu/lps-lacp/27> (last accessed 2 June 2013). Chowdhury con-
tends (at 5-6) that, without identifying the tangible content of SERs and linking that con-
tent to the actual satisfaction of material needs, SERs are reduced to meaningless
rhetoric.
43 S Rosa and M Dutschke (children's Institute, University of Cape Town) "Child rights at the
core: A commentary on the use of international law in South African court cases on chil-
dren's socio-economic rights" (a Project 28 working paper, May 2006) at 12; RE Robertson
"Measuring state compliance with the obligation to devote the 'maximum available
resources' to realising economic, social and cultural rights" (1994) 16 Human Rights
Quarterly 693 at 701. See also M Craven "Assessment of the progress on adjudication of
economic, social and cultural rights" in J Squires, M Langford and B Thiele (eds) The
Road to a Remedy. Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(2005, Australian Human Rights Centre, The University of New South Wales, in collabor-
ation with the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) 27 at 39, who defines the mini-
mum core content of rights as representing a quantitative or qualitative threshold of
enjoyment; and the South African Human Rights Commission "7th report on economic
and social rights: Millennium Development Goals and the progressive realisation of eco-
nomic and social rights in South Africa: 2006-2009" (2010) at 14, where the commission
affirms that the minimum core obligations are an inherent component of the progres-
sive realisation test and that the two cannot be divorced from one another.
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This article aims to analyse the potential of the minimum core approach in
the realisation of the entrenched SERs in the 2010 Constitution. After this
introduction it analyses the foundational origins of the minimum core
approach, before undertaking an analysis of the legitimacy of the develop-
ment of the minimum core approach at the international level by the treaty
monitoring mechanisms that have the mandate to interpret treaty provisions
and how this percolates to the national level. Taking this legitimacy into
account, the article then analyses the viability of the adoption of the mini-
mum core approach in Kenya, before considering the embryonic jurispru-
dence of the Kenyan courts in relation to the minimum core approach.
There follows an examination of the minimum core approach in two com-
parative jurisdictions: South Africa where the Constitutional Court has failed
to embrace the minimum core approach; and Colombia, where the
Constitutional Court has adopted a wholehearted espousal of the minimum
core approach in its SER jurisprudence. The article thus proposes that Kenya
should follow the Colombian example and adopt the minimum core
approach with the aim of enhancing the achievement of the transformative
aspirations of the 2010 Constitution. The article closes with a short conclusion.
THE FOUNDATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE MINIMUM CORE
OBLIGATIONS
The minimum core approach entails two related components: the minimum
core content that defines the nature or essential elements of an SER without
which the right loses its substantive significance as a human right; and the
minimum core obligations, which are the immediate measures a state must
put in place to realise the minimum essential levels of an SER.44 The mini-
mum core approach was developed by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its effort to establish a minimum legal sub-
stance for the SERs entrenched in the ICESCR, with the aim of enhancing
the prioritization of the socio-economic needs of most poor and vulnerable
groups.45 It was developed as an intrinsic component of the standard of "pro-
gressive realisation" and the CESCR determined it as follows: "[a] minimum
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essen-
tial levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party. Thus, for
example, a state party in which a significant number of individuals are
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary healthcare, of basic shel-
ter and housing, or of the most basic form of education is, prima fade, failing
to discharge its obligations under the [ICESCR]."
46
44 A Chapman and S Russell "Introduction" in A Chapman and S Russell (eds) Core
Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002,
Intersentia) 1 at 9.
45 KG Young Constituting Economic and Social Rights (2012, Oxford University Press) at 67-68.
46 Gen Comm No 3, para 10.
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The CESCR further stated that a reading of the ICESCR obligations devoid of
the minimum core is tantamount to depriving them of their raison d'ftre.
The committee has thus been at the forefront of developing a comprehensive
minimum core jurisprudence detailing the content of the SERs in the
ICESCR.47 The importance of developing the minimum core content of SERs
was affirmed by Phillip Alston, who argues that the logical implication of
terming SERs as rights is that SERs must give rise to some minimum entitle-
ments, the absence of which must be considered to be a violation of states'
SER obligations.
48
The development of the minimum core relates closely to the "basic needs"
paradigm developed under the 1976 World Employment Conference, which
espoused the commitment of all ILO member states to provide:
"(i) the minimal consumption requirements needed for a physically healthy
population (food, shelter, clothing); (ii) access to essential services and amen-
ities (safe drinking water, sanitation, health and education); (iii) access of all
to adequately remunerated employment opportunities; and, (iv) the satisfac-
tion of the needs of a more qualitative nature (a healthy humane environment,
and popular participation in making decisions that affect the lives and liveli-
hoods of the people and their individual freedoms)."49
This basic needs paradigm, like the minimum core content approach, is based
on human dignity and finds expression in the understanding that human dig-
nity is entrenched in the material and non-material conditions of life required
for human survival and happiness.50 As an ILO member state, Kenya is under
an obligation to enforce these standards in accordance with its 1LO commit-
ments, a process of realisation which will go far in fulfilling the minimum
core of the entrenched SERs.
The imperative for Kenya, and indeed other states, to adopt these basic mini-
mum standards has been enhanced by the development in international
47 See for example: Gen Comm No 12 on the right to adequate food, paras 6, 8 and 33; Gen
Comm No 13 on the right to education, para 57; Gen Comm No 14 on the right to the
highest attainable standard of health, paras 43 and 47; Gen Comm No 15 on the right to
water, para 37; Gen Comm No 17 on the author's right to benefit from the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production, para 39;
Gen Comm No 18 on the right to work, para 31; Gen Comm No 19 on the right to social
security, paras 59-61; and Gen Comm No 21 on the right of everyone to take part in cul-
tural life, paras 55, 59 and 67.
48 P Alston "Out of the abyss: The challenges confronting the new United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly
332 at 352-53.
49 "Employment, growth and basic needs: A one-world problem" (report of the director-
general of the International Labour Office, 1976) at 7, quoted in D Olowu "Human devel-
opment challenges in Africa: A rights-based approach" (2004) 5 San Diego International
Law Journal 179 at 200.
50 Id at 201.
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human rights law, especially in the context of the minimum core approach, as
evidenced in the General Comments of the CESCR, to the point that resource
constraints are no longer a justification for a state to fail to meet its minimum
core obligations. This progression commenced from the CESCR General
Comment No 3, which allowed states to use the justification of resource con-
strains if they failed to realise their minimum core obligations.51 Despite this
concession to resource constraints, the CESCR emphasized that states did not
have carte blanche to use this as an absolute defence for their failure to realise
SERs, and required a high threshold which would be fulfilled if a state was able
to show that it had used all the resources at its disposal to satisfy its minimum
core obligations as a matter of priority.52 In this context, the CESCR stated: "[ijn
order for a state party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its mini-
mum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that
every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an
effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations."
53
The CESCR further emphasized that "even where the available resources are
demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State Party to strive to
ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevail-
ing circumstances".4 In this context, the minimum core approach affirms
that, even in highly strained circumstances, the state retains an irreducible
obligation to meet the minimum essential needs of those in the most deplor-
able socio-economic situations.
55
However, the committee contended in subsequent General Comments,
such as General Comment No 14 and General Comment No 15, that the real-
isation of the minimum core was non-derogable and failure to realise it could
not be justified by reliance on the lack of availability of resources. General
Comment No 14 provides:
"if resource constraints render it impossible for a State to comply fullywith its
Covenant obligations, it has the burden ofjustifying that every effort has never-
theless been made to use all available resources at its disposal in order to sat-
isfy, as a matter of priority, the obligations outlined above. It should be stressed,
however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its
non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are
non-derogable."
56
51 CESCR Gen Comm No 3, para 10, which states that "it must be noted that any assessment
as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take
account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned".
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Id, para 11.
55 Id, para 12; Chapman and Russell "Introduction", above at note 44 at 10.
56 CESCR Gen Comm No 14 (2000) covering the right to the highest attainable standards of
health, para 47 (emphasis added).
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General Comment 15 further provides:
"To demonstrate compliance with their general and specific obligations, States
must establish that they have taken the necessary and feasible steps towards
the realisation of the right to water. In accordance with international law, a
failure to act in good faith to take such steps amounts to a violation of the
right. It should be stressed that a State party cannot justify its non-compliance with
the core obligations set out in paragraph 37 above, which are non-derogable."
57
The principles and guidelines on SERs in the African Charter also acknowledge
this progressive shift in the minimum core approach, by stating that they
form part of a state's immediate obligations with regard to the implementa-
tion of SERs.5 8 The principles further state that these minimum obligations
exist regardless of the availability of resources and are non-derogable:
"This [minimum core] obligation exists regardless of the availability of
resources and is non-derogable. When a State claims that it has failed to realise
minimum essential evels of [SERs] it must be able to show that it has allocated
all available resources towards the realisation of these rights, and particularly
towards the realisation of the minimum core content. Where the State does
suffer from demonstrable resource constraints, caused by whatever reason,
including economic adjustment, the State should still implement measures
to ensure the minimum essential levels of each right to members of vulner-
able and disadvantaged groups, particularly by prioritising them in all
interventions."
5 9
The progressive development in the minimum core approach discussed above
has been reiterated by the UN special rapporteur on SERs, Danilo Turk, who
contends that "[s]tates with specific legal obligations to fulfil [SERs] are obliged,
regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure respect for mini-
mum subsistence rights for all".60 The minimum core approach calls for
57 CESCR Gen Comm No 15 (2003) covering the right to water, para 40 (emphasis added).
58 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights "The principles and guidelines
on the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights" (adopted May 2010), para 16, available at: <http://
www.achpr.org/files/instruments/economic-social-cultural/achpr-instrguide-draft esc
rights-eng.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
59 Id, para 17 (foomotes omitted).
60 Second progress report prepared by Danilo Turk, special rapporteur, UN Commission
on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17, para 52(d), available at <http://www.unhchr.
ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.SUB.2.1991.17.En?Opendocument>
(last accessed 10 June 2013). See also Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, principle 25, available
at <http://www.acpp.org/RBAVerl_0/archives/Limburg/20Principles.pdf> (last accessed
13 June 2015); and Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
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resource allocation to be prioritized in the realisation of the minimum essen-
tial goods and services to the most vulnerable in society, and also entails a
stricter standard of judicial review in relation to the courts' enforcement of
entrenched SERs.61 The jurisprudence shows the shift in international obliga-
tions with regard to the realisation of the minimum essential elements of
SERs; it is thus imperative that Kenya take this into account when developing
the framework for the implementation of entrenched SERs, as well as in SER
adjudication.
There are several advantages in Kenya, and indeed any state with justiciable
SERs, adopting the minimum core approach with the aim of uplifting the liv-
ing standards of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups in society. It
has been argued that the minimum core approach, with its clear specification
of the minimum essential elements that the state must provide, gives the gov-
ernment a better standard with which to monitor implementation and pro-
vides better protection for SERs generally, and of the basic needs of
vulnerable groups in particular.62 This is starkly captured by Danie Brand
who contends that the interpretation and enforcement of entrenched SERs
should, in the first instance, be aimed at "the creation of a society that pro-
vides for everyone's basic needs, and that protects everyone against depriv-
ation".63 He argues that a court, in undertaking SER litigation, must
determine whether the state is pursuing its constitutionally mandated goal
correctly in its policies, and in doing so must, of necessity, develop a
contd
Rights, guideline 9, available at <https://wwwl.umnedu/humants/instree/Maastricht
guidelines.htnil> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
61 S Liebenberg "The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights" (2005)
21 South African Journal on Human Rights 436.
62 For a more complete development of these arguments, see Bilchitz Poverty and
Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 150-66 and 221; id "Health" in S Woolman
et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed, 2009, Juta) chap 56A at 31-32,
where Bilchitz avers that one of the evils sought to be remedied by the introduction
of the minimum core concept was the lack of practical benchmarks against which to
evaluate state fforts to realise entrenched SERs.
63 D Brand "The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence or
'what are socio-economic rights for?'" in H Botha, A van der Walt and J van der Walt (eds)
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003, Sun Press) 33 at 36-37. He
emphasizes that the real problem to be targeted by efforts aimed at the realisation of
SERs should be deprivation and hardship itself. He contends that, in adopting the rea-
sonableness approach, the South African Constitutional Court distanced itself from
the concrete particular realities of hunger, homelessness, disease and illiteracy with
which the entrenchment of SERs was intended to deal. He enumerates (at 51-56) the
negative effects of the reasonableness approach to be: the failure to enhance the realisa-
tion of the transformative potential of the constitution; the discouragement of future
creative SER litigation aimed at effecting social change; the burdening of indigent liti-
gants with the burden to prove the unreasonableness of state policy;, the availability of
limited tools for the courts to deal with subsequent SER litigation; and the lack of sub-
stantive standards to guide the state in future socio-economic policy-making.
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substantive content to the entrenched SERs.64 This has also been affirmed by
Sandra Liebenberg who, in her analysis of the Soobramoney judgment, argued
that the failure by the South African Constitutional Court (SACC) to expound
on the nature, scope and content of the right to health left the state with no
clear guidelines for its implementation, thus adversely affecting the capacity
of the right to exert a fundamental influence on the state's decision-making
concerning social programmes and budgetary allocations.
65
The minimum core approach makes it possible for the courts to adopt a
more stringent scrutiny in evaluating the state's defences for the non-
realisation of the minimum essential needs of the most vulnerable.
66 It fur-
ther makes it more feasible for the courts to provide the government with
clear timelines within which to implement the court's orders, and also
enables the court properly to monitor and supervise compliance with its
own orders.67 This is in line with the constitutional requirement that the
courts grant effective relief in instances of violations of constitutionally
entrenched human rights and fundamental freedoms.
68
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINIMUM
CORE APPROACH AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL AND WHY
KENYA SHOULD ADOPT THE APPROACH
The most important question at this juncture is whether there is any obliga-
tion on Kenya to adopt the minimum core approach, and how the adoption
of the approach can spur on the implementation of SERs. This question raises
three pertinent issues for discussion. First, from where do the treaty monitor-
ing mechanisms, especially the CESCR, obtain their legitimacy to interpret the
relevant international legal instruments and how does this warrant states' vol-
untary compliance with the monitoring bodies' interpretations? Secondly, do
the monitoring bodies, in their interpretation of the ICESCR and in the devel-
opment of the minimum core obligations, employ interpretive approaches
that are consistent with the rules of interpretation accepted under inter-
national law? Thirdly, what has been the practice of states in relation to the
64 Id at 44-51. He points out that the major failure of the South African Constitutional
Court's reasonableness approach is the failure to develop substantive content for SERs.
He states (at 48-49) that, due to this failure, the court cannot, in the conduct of its rea-
sonableness analysis, determine whether the state's policy in question is capable of
achieving the relevant right (as the substantive content of the essential referent tight
is not developed), leaving the court only with the option of evaluating whether the pol-
icy in question is rational, coherent, comprehensive and indusive, among other good
governance standards.
65 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010,
Juta & Co) at 142.
66 Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 146.
67 Ibid.
68 2010 Constitution, art 23.
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general recommendations that have been adopted by treaty monitoring bod-
ies, especially the CESCR?
These issues are broadly dealt with below, with the objective of making a
case for the adoption of the minimum core approach in Kenya.
Interpretive legitimacy and authority of treaty monitoring bodies
The treaties detailing SERs have reporting mechanisms created by state parties
to monitor state implementation of the treaties, be it through state reporting,
consideration of individual, group or state communications, or by conducting
inquiries. The mandates of these treaty bodies give them the authorization to
interpret the provisions of relevant treaties in line with their experiences
through the formulation of General Comments. Part IV of the ICESCR man-
dates the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to receive state reports69
and to produce General Comments to assist states and UN specialized agencies
in implementing their obligations under the covenant.70
In order to enhance the implementation of its mandate, ECOSOC created
the CESCR in May 1986,71 to take over from the ECOSOC Sessional Working
Group of Government Experts that had been monitoring implementation
on behalf of ECOSOC from 1976.72 The committee is composed of experts
with recognized competence in SERs; they act in their personal capacity,
which enhances their impartiality and independence.73 They also represent
different geographical, legal and social systems of the world, enhancing the
consideration of different world views in the committee's interpretation of
covenant provisions. The CESCR is mandated to submit to ECOSOC a report
of its activities, including a summary of its consideration of state reports
and general recommendations, so as to facilitate ECOSOC in its responsibilities
under articles 22-22 of the covenant.74 Alston simplifies this mandate into the
following responsibilities: "(1) the clarification of the normative content of
each of the relevant rights; (2) the encouragement of more meaningful report-
ing by State parties; (3) the improved cooperation with relevant UN bodies,
including the specialised agencies; (4) the facilitation of greater input from
non-governmental organisations; and (5) the effective follow-up to the examin-
ation of States' reports."
75
Though the CESCR was not specifically established in the ICESCR, as is the
norm with other treaty monitoring bodies, its establishment was authorized
and done in accordance with the covenant. The fact that its work is mainly
69 ICESCR, arts 16-20.
70 Id, arts 21-22.
71 It was established under ECOSOC res 1985/17 of 28 May 1985, ESC res 1985/17, 1985 UN
ESCOR supp (No 1) at 15, UN doc E/1985/85 (1985).
72 See Alston "Out of the abyss", above at note 48 at 333. He details (at 335-49) the failures of
the working group which led to the establishment of the CESCR.
73 ESC res 1985/17, above at note 71, para b.
74 Id, para f.
75 Alston "Out of the abyss", above at note 48 at 349-79.
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aimed at assisting ECOSOC, the body that was conventionally mandated to
monitor the implementation of ICESCR, does not detract from the authenti-
city of its mandate and the legitimacy of its interpretation of the covenant
as is encompassed in its Concluding Observations and General Comments.
The legitimacy of the other treaty monitoring bodies which have similarly
adopted the minimum core approach in the interpretation of the SERs in
their relevant treaties, such as the CEDAW Committee, CRC Committee and
the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee),
have not generated much debate, as their mandates are provided for within
the text of the relevant treaties. The CEDAW Committee is established under
part V of the convention76 and article 21 provides for its mandate to make sug-
gestions and adopt General Recommendations based on the consideration of
state reports and information received from state parties. The acceptability of
its General Recommendations can be gleaned from the fact that, even though
CEDAW provides for a system of dispute resolution in instances of a difference
in interpretation or application, the system has so far not been used to chal-
lenge any of the interpretations of the convention as provided by the
CEDAW Committee.
77
The CRC Committee is established under part H of the CRC.78 It is mandated
to receive and consider state reports79 and to make General Recommendations
based on information received from state parties and other specialized agen-
cies in accordance with articles 44 and 45.80 Lastly, the CRPD Committee is
established under article 34 of the convention with the task of considering
state reports;81 it can also make suggestions and General Recommendations
based on the examination of state reports and on information received
from state parties.
82
Since states have ratified these relevant treaties knowing the mandates of
the monitoring bodies, they have, in good faith, undertaken to be bound to
accept the authenticity and legitimacy of the General Recommendations
emanating from them, and should thus be expected to be bound, or at least
to be authoritatively persuaded, by the General Recommendations emanating
from these bodies in good faith. In relation to the CESCR, this conclusion is
supported by Alston and Qyinn, who contend that, if state parties have ratified
the covenant in good faith, and given the CESCR genuine authority as the body
charged with interpreting the covenant provisions, then they must, as a neces-
sity, be bound by the interpretation that the CESCR has accorded to the treaty,
76 CEDAW, art 17.
77 Id, art 29(1).
78 CRC, art 43.
79 Id, art 44.
80 Id, art 45(d).
81 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, arts 35-36.
82 Id, art 39.
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including the incorporation of the minimum core approach into state parties'
SER obligations.
83
Compliance of the treaty monitoring bodies with rules of
interpretation under international law
On this second question, SERs are part of human rights law, which is part of
the larger body of international law. Accordingly, the customary rules of treaty
interpretation, albeit with a little adjustment due to the unique nature of
human rights instruments, also apply to SERs.84 The customary rules of inter-
pretation are encapsulated in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Article 31(1) is especially informative as it calls for treaty provi-
sions to be interpreted in good faith taking into account not only their ordin-
ary meaning (literal interpretation), but also the objects and purpose of the
relevant treaty (teleological interpretation) and the context in which the treaty
is applied (systematic interpretation). To support article 31 farther, the Vienna
Convention provides other aids to interpretation, which include the prepara-
tory works of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
85
In using these rules to interpret human rights treaties, the monitoring bod-
ies are expected to take into account the objects and purposes of the relevant
treaty, and to undertake an expansive interpretation aimed at providing the
greatest and most effective protection to individuals and groups.8 6 This should
be done in accordance with the principle of good faith, which requires that
83 p Alston and G qunn "The nature and scope of state parties obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Human
Rights Quarterly 156 at 160-61.
84 MM Sepulveda The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (2003, Intersentia) at 74 and 77-87. She undertakes an extensive
discussion, quoting several authors and decisions of the International Court of justice, in
particular the advisory opinion of 28 May 1951 on the reservation to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which indicate the special
nature of human rights treaties as treaties granting protection to individuals and groups
who are not parties to the treaty but who nevertheless need protection.
85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 32.
86 Sepulveda The Nature of the obligations, above at note 84 at 79. She quotes the European
Court in Soering v United Kingdom 161 Eur Ct HR (ser A) (1989) where the court stated, at
para 87, that: "In interpreting the Convention, regard must be had to its special character
as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms ...
thus the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of
individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as
to make its safeguards practical and effective." She further discusses the need for an evo-
lutive interpretation of human rights treaties, taling into account developments in
international human rights law and in the context of present day conditions, basically
adopting the "living instrument principle". She refers (at 80) to the European Court
case of Airey v Ireland 32 Eur Ct HR (ser A) (1979) where the court stated in relation to
the European Convention on Human Rights, at para 26, that "the Convention must be
interpreted in the light of present day conditions and it is designed to safeguard the indi-
vidual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals".
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positive rules of law contained in treaties are interpreted and applied honestly,
fairly and reasonably.8 7 The customary norms of treaty interpretation as well
as the principle of good faith have been effectively employed in practice by the
treaty monitoring bodies in interpreting the contents of the relevant legal
instruments. A case in point is the CESCR which has undertaken an expansive
interpretation to make the entrenched SER provisions effective and practical
in the protection of the relevant groups and individuals. This can be seen in
the development of states' minimum core obligations, which are aimed at giv-
ing content to SERs to make them practical in the protection of marginalized
and vulnerable groups.
88
State practice in relation to the General Comments of treaty
monitoring bodies
On this third issue, and as discussed above, the treaty monitoring bodies are
authoritatively mandated to monitor the implementation of the relevant
treaties and, as such, have the authority to interpret the scope of the treaties'
provisions through General Comments. Through their General Comments,
the monitoring bodies have developed the minimum core obligations as
being implicit in the obligations of states in accordance with the relevant
treaties.8 9 Even though under traditional international law these General
Comments are not legally binding on member states, it is beyond doubt
that they carry considerable legal clout.90 This is reflected in the wide accept-
ance of the monitoring bodies' General Comments by state parties to those
relevant treaties.91 Kenya, as a state party to the relevant treaties is, therefore,
under an obligation to fulfil its obligations under these treaties in good faith,
including the realisation of its minimum core obligations on SERs through
the adoption of the minimum core approach. Failure to do so will be indica-
tive of bad faith.92
87 Sepulveda, id at 76.
88 CESCR Gen Comm No 9, paras 11 and 15; Gen Comm No 12, para 6; and Gen Comm No
14, para 11.
89 CESCR Gen Comm No 3, para 10.
90 Sepulveda The Nature of the obligations, above at note 84 at 88; Craven The International
Covenant, above at note 39 at 91.
91 See L Chenwi "Monitoring the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights: Lessons
from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
South African Constitutional Court" (2010) at 4-5 (on file with author); and Craven, id
at 92. Both authors contend that the endorsement of the General Comments of the
CESCR by ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly, where a number of state parties partici-
pate in the consideration of the committee's report, is a clear indication of acceptance of
the interpretation given to the ICESCR provisions by the committee. See also Chowdhury
"Judicial adherence", above at note 42 at 5, who states that national courts have been
known to draw from the CESCR's General Comments when they adopt the minimumn
core approach.
92 Sepulveda The Nature of the Obligations, above at note 84 at 88.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIABILITY OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
KENYA'S SER JURISPRUDENCE
It is generally accepted that, where there is doubt with regard to the meaning
or import of domestic law, that law should be interpreted in a way that gives
credence to the relevant international obligations accruing to the state due to
its ratification of international legal instruments.93 As noted above, Kenya has
assumed international SER obligations by ratifying several international and
regional legal instruments. The 2010 Constitution acknowledges that all
these international human rights instruments, and all the general rules of
international law accruing from them, form part of Kenyan law.94 The SER
provisions of these ratified international legal instruments have been inter-
preted, by the authoritative mechanisms responsible for monitoring the
implementation of those instruments, to include the minimum core obliga-
tions discussed above. In its development of the minimum core approach,
the CESCR endorsed the approach as a guide to states in their domestic imple-
mentation and enforcement of SERs95 with the objective of responding to the
perennial SER justiciability challenges of lack of clarity and content.9 6
Katharine Young, in her support of the applicability of the minimum core
approach at the national constitutional level, contends that the approach
can assist national courts in three aspects of adjudicating SERs: the determin-
ation of the state's obligations to respect such rights negatively; the determin-
ation of the state's obligation to "progressively realise" such rights in their
protection and fulfilment; and the determination of the state's obligation to
justify any limitation of SERs, using a more stringent external limitation
clause such as article 24 of the 2010 Constitution.97 Taking into account the
doctrine of good faith, Kenya must thus be bound to adopt the interpretation
of the monitoring bodies on the minimum core obligations and implement
them in its legislative, policy and programmatic framework aimed at the real-
isation of the entrenched SERs, as well as in the adjudicatory practices of the
courts.98
93 Alston and Quinn "The nature and scope", above at note 83 at 171.
94 See the discussion of art 2(6) of the constitution in the "Introduction" to this article.
95 See CESCR Gen Comm No 12, para 33; Gen Comm No 14, para 60; Gen Comm No 15, para
57; and Gen Comm No 18, para 49.
96 Young Constituting Economic and Social Rights, above at note 45 at 78-79.
97 Id at 82-83. In its limitations role, the minimum core approach reverses the onus of
proof in SER litigation, with the requirement that, once the claimant has shown that
the minimum core of any particular right has not been protected, the onus reverts to
the state to show either that it has put in place reasonable legislative measures within
its available resources to realise the light in question, or to justify the reasonableness
of its limitation of the right in question. In this way, the minimum core turns the
SER paper rights into practical reality for claimants.
98 For the importance of adopting the minimum core obligations, see: Limburg Principles,
above at note 60, principle 5; and Maastricht Guidelines, above at note 60, guideline 8.
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An expansive reading of the SERs entrenched in the 2010 Constitution to
incorporate the minimum core approach is envisaged by the constitution
itself, especially article 20(2) which provides for the enjoyment of rights
in the constitution to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of
the rights. This is further buttressed by article 20(3)(b) which calls for the
adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforcement of
rights,99 and article 24(2)(c) which provides that any provision in legislation
limiting a right or fundamental freedom must not limit the right to such
an extent that derogates from the right's core or essential content. To
enhance the standard of living of vulnerable groups and communities,
the constitution also entrenches the state's duty to provide for their
needs as follows: "[a]ll State organs and all public officers have the duty
to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society, including
women, older members of society, persons with disabilities, children,
youth, members of minority or marginalised communities, and members
of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities."100
The state's obligation to enhance the socio-economic condition of vulner-
able groups and communities is further buttressed by article 20(5)(b) which
requires the state to prioritize the allocation of resources towards the realisa-
tion of rights as follows: "[i]n allocating resources, the State shall give priority
to ensuring the widest possible enjoyment of the right or fumdamental free-
dom having regard to prevailing circumstances, including the vulnerability
of particular groups or individuals."
It therefore follows that, for the entrenched SERs to achieve the purpose for
which they were intended, in accordance with article 19(2) of the 2010
Constitution,10 1 the minimum core obligations envisaged by the entrenched
SERs must be upheld. This proposal is in line with the recommendations of
the CESCR which has been categorical that an understanding or reading of
substantive SERs which does not incorporate the minimum core deprives
SERs of their raison d'&tre. In this vein, the CESCR has emphasized the neces-
sity of an extensive and inclusive interpretation of SER obligations, and has
categorically called on states not to interpret SER provisions in a way that
contd
See also CESCR Gen Comm No 9, paras 3 and 15, which require states to interpret
domestic legal provisions in a manner that gives credence to their international law obli-
gations and discourages reliance on national laws to defeat international legal
obligations.
99 See also 2010 Constitution, art 259(1) which calls for the provisions of the constitution to
be construed in a manner that: promotes its purposes, values and principles; advances
the rule of law and the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights; permits the develop-
ment of law, and contributes to good governance.
100 Id, art 21(3).
101 This article provides: "The purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fun-
damental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to
promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings."
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deprives them of their meaningful content, rendering them ineffective and
illusory.1
02
The adoption of the minimum core approach necessitates the development
of the substantive content of SERs. This, however, raises another set of ques-
tions: how pragmatically to determine the substantive content of the rights;
and how a determination of the substantive content of SERs will be beneficial
to Kenyans, especially the poor, vulnerable and marginalized. The first ques-
tion was one of the major concerns that led the SACC to decline to adopt
the minimum core approach to the interpretation of SERs.103 It raises the
dilemma of how, in a diverse society with different understandings of mini-
mum essential needs for human survival and well-being, a detailed and com-
prehensive theory of value can be imposed to determine what the minimum
core content of each SER entails.
However, in response to these concerns, the very entrenchment of justi-
ciable SERs in the 2010 Constitution can be said to acknowledge the very diver-
sity of society and that different individuals and groups have different needs
that must be provided for. These needs can be met either through the adop-
tion by the state of relevant legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks
to provide an enabling environment to allow people to meet their basic socio-
economic needs using their own resources, or through the actual provision of
basic socio-economic goods and services to individuals and groups who are
unable to provide for themselves. This acknowledgment resonates perfectly
with the international obligations of the state to respect, protect, promote
and fulfil SERs, as is entrenched in article 21(1) of the 2010 Constitution.'"
This, in essence, therefore places responsibility for the development of the
content of SERs squarely on the doorstep of the government, especially the
political institutions which bear the major responsibility for developing and
implementing measures aimed at the realisation of SERs.10 5
How then will the political institutions determine the content of SERs? The
author submits that there is no need to reinvent the wheel. A lot of work has
already been done in the international arena, especially by the CESCR,
the African Commission'0 6 and other international experts,10 7 to develop
the minimum essential elements for most of the SERs entrenched in the
102 CESCR Gen Comm No 14, para 31; Gen Comm No 13, para 44; Gen Comm No 9, para 11;
and Gen Comm No 3, para 9.
103 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), paras
32-33.
104 See 2010 Constitution, art 21(1).
105 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication, above at note 65 at 39-42.
106 See "The principles and guidelines", above at note 58, which developed the minimum
core obligations of the SERs entrenched in the African Charter in paras 17 (general),
59 (work), 67 (health), 71 (education), 79 (housing), 82 (social security), 86 (food), 92
(water and sanitation) and 97 (family life).
107 See generally Chapman and Russell (eds) Core obligations, above at note 44; P Hunt
Reclaiming Social Rights: International and Comparative Perspectives (1996, Dartmouth).
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constitution. All that is required of the state, therefore (and this can be done
almost immediately, without raising arguments about the availability of
resources), is to use available international and regional material to develop
the minimum essentials to the entrenched SERs, taking into account
Kenya's peculiar historical context, priorities and long-term objectives. This
should be done specifically by the state's political institutions, especially the
legislature and the executive, in their development of the legislative, policy
and programmatic framework for the realisation of the SERs entrenched
in the 2010 Constitution. If this is done in an inclusive process allowing
for the participation of all Kenyan people in accordance with articles 10,
118-19,108 196,109 201110 and 232(1)(d)"' of the constitution, the state will be
able to develop a detailed and comprehensive standard detailing the mini-
mum core content of the SERs that is inclusive and acceptable to all
Kenyans. As part of the process of developing the minimum core content of
SERs, the state must incorporate the requisite achievable targets, indicators,
benchmarks and specific timelines to provide guidance in the implementa-
tion, monitoring and evaluation of the plan of action, as well as enabling
the public and other watchdog institutions to monitor progress.112 The mini-
mum core content, as developed by the political institutions, will then be
polished by the courts over time, as and when cases dealing with specific
SERs come to the courts for interpretation.
The adoption of the minimum core approach will be beneficial to the poor,
and vulnerable and marginalized individuals, groups and communities
because it will breathe life into abstract constitutional provisions and ensure
that the government has clear criteria within which to structure its legislation,
policies and programmes aimed at implementing the entrenched SERs. Such
criteria will involve the development of the content of the abstract SERs in the
constitution to ensure that both the citizenry and the government have a dear
understanding of the nature, content and extent of the rights provided by the
constitutional provisions and a clear understanding of the duties they impose
on state institutions. Such criteria are also important for the donor commu-
nity, international agencies, and national and international NGOs as they
can then choose specific aspects within the criteria to fund and also have
clear indicators for monitoring the state's policies and programmes for the
implementation of SERs.
108 Requires Parliament to facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative
as well as other businesses of Parliament and its committees.
109 Requires county assemblies to facilitate public participation and involvement in the
legislative as well as other businesses of the county assemblies.
110 Contains the principles of public finance which require openness and accountability,
including public participation in financial matters.
111 Envisages public participation in the design of the policy and programmatic frameworks
for the implementation of entrenched SERs.
112 S Liebenberg "The interpretation of socio-economic tights" in Woolman et al
Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 2 (2nd ed, 2009, Juta) chap 33 at 42.
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EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE IN THE KENYAN COURTS IN
RELATION TO THE MINIMUM CORE APPROACH
Even though Kenya's SER jurisprudence is still in its tender years of develop-
ment, the current constitution having only been promulgated in 2010,
Kenyan courts have already shown a propensity towards an expansive and pro-
gressive interpretation of constitutional rights to accord with international
law. These can be seen in Kabui Mwai where the court relied heavily on the
education provisions of the ICESCR as well as the elaboration of the right to
education in the CESCR's General Comment No 13 interpreting the right to
education in article 43(1)(f) of the 2010 Constitution.
11 3
Kabui Mwai dealt with a challenge to the state's policy to put in place a quota
system to ensure equitable access to national secondary schools between pri-
mary school learners in public and private schools.1 4 The policy was chal-
lenged by the private schools as being discriminatory against their pupils
and thus unconstitutional.11 5 In determining the case, the court aff-ned
the importance of the national values and principles of governance enshrined
in article 10(2)(b) of the 2010 Constitution, as well as the purposes for the con-
stitutional recognition and protection of human rights: the preservation of
human dignity, the promotion of social justice; and the realisation of the
potential of all human beings as enshrined in article 19(2) of the constitu-
tion.116 The court further acknowledged that, in interpreting the Bill of
Rights, it had to promote the values underlying an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality, equity and freedom, as enshrined
in article 20(4)(a) of the constitution, as well as abide by its duty to address
the needs of vulnerable groups within society as per article 21(3) of the consti-
tution.11 7 The court also recognized that the entrenchment ofjusticiable SERs
in the constitution was aimed at advancing the socio-economic needs of the
people, especially the poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups so as to uplift
their human dignity, with the objective of achieving an egalitarian transform-
ation of society.
118
Having set this background, the court proceeded to adopt a substantive and
contextual conception of equality, borrowing from the concept of "unfair dis-
crimination" as propounded by the SACC in President of the Republic of South
Africa and Another v Hugo.1'9 Taking this into account, the court held that
not all differential treatment resulted in the violation of the equality and non-
discrimination articles of the 2010 Constitution, and that the state could
113 Kabui Mwai, above at note 26 at 6-7.
114 See id at 1-2.
115 Id at 2-4.
116 Id at 5.
117 Ibid.
118 Id at 6.
119 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo (CCT1/96) 1997 (4) SA 1, para
41; id at 8-9.
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legitimately put in place affirmative action, as is dearly authorized by article
27(6) of the constitution, to protect and uplift the situation of historically mar-
ginalized groups in society.120 The court thus held that, in order for it to
achieve the transformative aspirations of the constitution, it had to temper
merit with equity, as the previous policy based on merit alone had occasioned
unfairness and prejudice to candidates from public schools who had to com-
pete for the few slots available in national secondary schools from a point of
disadvantage, due to a lack of necessary infrastructural facilities as well as
financial and human resources.
21
Did Kabui Mwai espouse or reject the minimum core approach? Jotham
Arwa contends as follows: "[i]n the few cases that have been hieard by the
courts since the promulgation of the new constitution, the courts appear to
have adopted an attitude that is hostile to the adoption of the minimum
core approach. As has been illustrated by the decision in Kabui Mwai, the
Kenyan Constitutional Court on 16 September 2011 rejected the application
of the minimum core approach."
122
In making this statement, Arwa did not point to any specific paragraph of
the Kabui Mwai judgment or any other court documents on the case, nor
did he mention any of the earlier cases where the Kenyan courts had categor-
ically rejected the minimum core approach. His statement above might have
been premised on the pronouncement of the court in Kabui Mwai that:
"The realisation of socio-economic rights means the realisation of the condi-
tions of the poor and less advantaged and the beginning of a generation
that is free from socio-economic need. One of the obstacles to the realisation
of this objective, however, is limited financial resources on the part of the
Government. The available resources are not adequate to facilitate the inime-
diate provision of socio-economic goods and services to everyone on demand
as individual rights. There has to be a holistic approach to providing socio-
economic goods and services that focus beyond the individual."
Socio-economic rights are by their very nature ideologically loaded. The real-
isation of these rights involves the making of ideological challenges which,
120 KabuiMwai, idat 9. The court stated: "When the Consfitutionwas adopted, the framers knew,
and dearly had in mind, the different status of persons in the society and the need to protect
the weak from being overrun by those with ability. Theyhad in mind the historyof this coun-
try, both the differences in endowment either by dint of the region where one came from or
as a function of other factors, which might necessitate special protection. Rightly or wrongly,
and it is not for the court to decide, the framers of the Constitution manifestly regarded as
inadequate a blanket right to equal treatment, and their intention was to remedy the per-
ceived societal inequalities thus recognising the necessity of corrective measures ... It was
out of the realisation that unequal people cannot be treated equally."
121 Id at 10-11.
122 JO Arwa "Litigating socio-economic rights in domestic courts: The Kenyan experience"
(2013) 17 Law, Democracy and Development Journal 419 at 435, available at: <http://www.
saflii.org/za/joumals/LDD/2013/20.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
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among others, impact on the nature of the country's economic system. This is
because these rights engender positive obligations and have budgetary impli-
cations which require making political choices. In our view, a public body
should be given appropriate leeway in determining the best way of meeting
its constitutional obligations."
123
The court may have erred in stating that SERs are ideologically loaded to the point
of impacting on the nature of a country's economic system, but it was correct to
point out that resources are an important component in the realisation of
entrenched SERs and that, due to resource constraints, it would not have been pos-
sible to provide all the entrenched SERs to allpeople immediately on demand. This
is the very reason why the standard of progressive realisation has been adopted
both nationally and internationally in the realisation of SERs. Therefore, the
court's contention that a holistic approach that focuses beyond the individual
be adopted for the realisation of SERs did not necessarily mean that the court
was rejecting the minimum core approach. In this context, it is submitted
that Arwa's statement is not only misleading, but may actually be false, as the
court in Kabui Mwai was never presented with a minimum core approach argu-
ment by any of the counsel in the case, and no submissions were made requiring
the court to make a determination of the minimum core content of the right to
education. The court was faced with an equality and non-discrimination contro-
versy, which it dealt with substantively and progressively, taking into account
Kenya's historical and prevailing contextual socio-economic situation and the
values underpinning the constitution, as well as relying heavily on international
and comparative law sources. It is thus incorrect to conclude that the court in
Kabui Mwai rejected the minimum core approach to the realisation of SERs.
It is clear that the court in Kabui Mwai did not make any pronouncement
with regard to the minimum core approach, but this does not answer the
question as to the predisposition of the Kenyan courts towards the approach.
A case in which the High Court of Kenya did make a pronouncement with
regard to the minimum core approach is Federation of Women Lawyers
(FIDA-K) where the court affirmed the state's obligation to realise the mini-
mum core of rights entrenched in article 27 as follows:
"In order for a State to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its mini-
mum core obligations due to any event or circumstance, it must demonstrate
that every effort has been made within its disposition in an effort to satisfy as a
matter of priority the minimum obligations set out in Article 27 as a whole. It
is clear from the extract from International Conventions that every party state
is bound to flilfil a minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction of a
minimum enjoyment of the rights enshrined under Article 27."
124
123 Kabui Mwai, above at note 26 at 6.
124 Federation of Women Lawyers and 5 Others v Attorney General and Another (FIDA-K) High
Court petition no 102 of 2011 at 47-48.
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In this case, however, the court noted the difficulty of determining the mini-
mum core for the realisation of the right to affinnative action due to differing
societal needs, a challenge that requires a holistic assessment of the vulnerabil-
ity of a variety of groups. The court then resorted to the standard of reason-
ableness, but retained the applicability of the minimum core approach in
determining the reasonableness of a measure for the realisation of rights as
follows: "[ain issue which would arise is whether the measures taken by the
State or State organ to realise the rights awarded by Article 27 are reasonable.
In that regard we think there may be cases or situations where it may be pos-
sible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obli-
gation to determine whether the measures taken or to be taken are reasonable
and satisfy the needs and aspirations of all vulnerable groups."
125
The dictum from the Federation of Women Lawyers case is thus indicative of
the applicability of the minimum core approach in the Kenyan context in rele-
vant circumstances to enhance the protection of SERs.
Applicability of the minimum core approach was further affirmed in an
equality and non-discrimination judicial review- case, Jared Juma v Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation and Others.126 This case challenged an employment
condition by the state broadcasting corporation that, for a person to qualify
for appointment as the managing director of the corporation, they must be
below the age of 45 years. The applicant argued that this was discriminatory
and contrary to article 27 of the 2010 Constitution as it was introduced arbi-
trarily to give undue advantage to the acting managing director and to lock
out competition for the position.127 In its determination of the constitution-
ality of the age limit, the court directed itself as follows:
"A Decision may be declared unconstitutional for various reasons including:
(i) Being contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution;
(ii) Being in violation of a principle, right or freedom provided in the
Constitution;
(iii) Being irrational or disproportionate taking into account the minimum core
content of the particular right."128
The court went on to find that the decision to limit the age of the managing
director to 45 years was so restrictive as to be construed as being grossly unrea-
sonable and unconstitutional as it did not conform to the minimum core con-
tent of the right to equality and non-discrimination as entrenched in article
27(4) of the 2010 Constitution.129 The court stated its finding as follows: "[t]he
decision was therefore grossly unreasonable as to amount to discrimination
125 Id at 48.
126 [2014] eKLR.
127 Id, paras 7-14.
128 Id, para 62 (emphasis added).
129 Id, para 69.
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on grounds of age contrary to Article 27(4) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010
... The decision [necessarily] excluded many worthy applicants from being
considered on merit to occupy the position of Managing Director of KBC.
The decision negated the minimum core content of the right provided
under Article 27(4)."130
It would have been more informative of the court in this instance to elabor-
ate on the right to equality and non-discrimination and to state clearly the
minimum as well as the more expansive contours of the right. Such an elab-
oration would have gone a long way towards crystallizing the content of rights
and enhancing the understanding of the minimum core approach for the pro-
tection of rights in general and socio-economic rights in particular. Despite
the failure in this instance, the court's adoption of the minimum core
approach signifies that the approach has application in the Kenyan context
and can effectively be adopted in the enforcement of the SERs entrenched
in the 2010 Constitution.
In relation to SERs, the willingness of the Kenyan courts to listen to a mini-
mum core argument was affirmed in Okwanda v Minister of Health,
where the court, decrying a lack of sufficient evidence and argument
made by the applicant in a case regarding the right to health and access to
medicine, stated:
"On the basis of the material before the court, I find that at least the
Government Hospitals provide healthcare to the petitioner at a cost
Whether the form of healthcare provided in these circumstances meets the
minimum core obligation or the highest standard is not one that was the sub-
ject of evidence and argument before me. The issue of the prohibitive costs
involved in accessing the treatment and whether such treatment should be
free bearing in mind the necessity to progressively realise these rights was
not explored in the depositions and therefore there is no basis upon which I
can make a finding one way or the other."
131
It is clear from this pronouncement hat, if sufficient evidence and cogent
arguments are made in relation to the minimum core approach in the adju-
dication of SER cases, the courts will be willing to listen to and adopt the
approach. The work, therefore, is for litigators to bring before the courts
cogent arguments and sufficient evidence so that the courts can be moved
to embrace the minimum core approach, as litigation in Kenya is adversarial
and the courts are reluctant to adopt new approaches for the enforcement of
rights of their own volition.
130 Id, paras 72-73.
131 Mathew Okwanda v Minister of Health and Medical Services and 3 Others [2013] eKLR, para 21.
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THE MINIMUM CORE APPROACH IN COMPARATIVE NATIONAL
JURISDICTIONS: SOUTH AFRICA AND COLOMBIA
A challenge to the minimum core approach in South Africa
The minimum core approach has, however, not received universal acclaim
and has faced its fair share of criticism. One of the staunchest critics of the
approach is the SACC which has persistently refused to adopt the approach
in several SER cases that it has adjudicated.132 Some of the reasons for the
court's refusal are as follows.
First, the court held that, due to the different contextual situation of indivi-
duals as well as their diverse and varying socio-economic needs, it is difficult
to define the minimum core content.133 Secondly, the court held that it did
not have the information or experience required to be able comprehensively
to determine the minimum core content of rights, given the diversity of needs
and circumstances of different groups; this differed from the position of the
CESCR which had extensive access to, and experience in scrutinizing, several
state reports under the ICESCR to enable it to define the minimum core con-
tent of rights.34 Thirdly, the court stated that the textual construction of the
relevant provisions of the South African Constitution did not support the
adoption of the minimum core approach, as sections 26(1) and 27(1) did not
give an independent and self-supporting positive right, but must be read in
relation to sections 26(2) and 27(2) which in effect limit or qualify the content
of the rights to the standards of progressive realisation, resource availability as
well as the reasonableness of government measures aimed at their realisa-
tion.135 Fourthly, the court argued that it was not pragmatic to read the
132 For example: Grootboom; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) (TAC); and Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) 2010
(3) BCLR 239 (CC). See SA Yeshanew "Approaches to the justiciability of economic, social
and cultural rights in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights: Progress and perspectives" (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal
317 at 322.
133 Grootboom, paras 32-33.
134 Id, para 31.
135 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), para 24; Grootboom,
para 95; TAC, para 32. The limiting of rights in this manner has been extensively criti-
cized by several authors who argue that, even though these standards should of necessity
limit the obligations of the state, they should not limit the meaning, nature, content and
scope of SERs. See K McLean "Housing" in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of
South Africa vol 4 (2nd ed, 2006, Juta) 55-1, at 55-9 - 55-12; Bilchitz "Health", above at
note 62 at 56A-9 - 10, especially note 4. Bilchitz especially argues passionately for an inde-
pendent determination of the content of rights, separate from the determination of the
obligations of the state, which he avers are the ones limited by the availability of
resources. He argues convincingly that the rationale for recognising fundamental rights
is the need to protect inherent basic human interests, which people have by virtue of
their human characteristics and not by virtue of the resources at their command. He
avers that the available resources only affect the capacity of people to realise these inher-
ent rights, and not the rights themselves. He thus contends that an understanding of the
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minimum core content into the SER provisions as this would impose unreal-
istic demands on the state due to the impossibility of giving everyone "access
even to a 'core' service immediately".136 Finally, the court acknowledged its
institutional incompetence to undertake the formulation of the minimum
core content of rights, holding that "courts are not institutionally equipped
to make the wide-ranging factual and political inquiries necessary for deter-
mining the minimum core standards".137 Despite these reasons, the court
did not completely reject ever elaborating the minimum core of SERs, holding
that the minimum core might be used to determine the reasonableness of a
state measure for the realisation of SERs in particular instances.
13 s
David Bilchitz, one of the staunchest critics of the SACC's refusal to adopt
the minimum core approach, has responded extensively to the criticism of
the minimum core approach provided above. He contends that the approach
is aimed at protecting the fundamental interests of individuals as well as pri-
oritizing and ameliorating the plight of the worse off, whose needs are not
adequately met by a reasonableness standard that fails to recognize the
equal importance of each person in society.139 He thus states that, taking
into account the weighted prioritization he advocates, the minimum core is
a flexible standard which takes into account the needs of the differently situ-
ated individuals and groups in society, and is thus not rigid and absolutist.
140
As has been pointed out by several authors, even though the court in
Grootboom did not expressly take up the minimum core arguments made by
the amici curiae [friends of the court] in that case, the inclusion of the
contd
content of rights separate from the issue of resources, the approach which he advocates,
makes it possible to expect the state to take measures to realise rights which are already
present as soon as the problem of scarcity of resources is lessened: see Bilchitz Poverty and
Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 40-42 and 215-20. See K McLean Constitutional
Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009) at 176-81 for similar argu-
ments. McLean provides at (179-81) four reasons for adopting her preferred reading; the
two critical ones are: first, that the jurisprudential soundness of having a right not
restricted by the availability of resources enables the court to align its interpretation
of the scope of SERs in accordance with international and comparative norms, and fur-
ther requires the state to justify failures to realise SERs; and secondly, that it allows for a
"wider socio-political understanding of tights as political or ethical daims against the
State which stand, even where the State is not able to realise these rights fully".
136 TAC, para 35.
137 Id, paras 37-38.
138 Grootboom, para 33; TAC, para 34. See also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication,
above at note 65 at 148-51 for a similar analysis.
139 Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 208-13. At 212, however, he
rejects lexical prioritization (the requirement that the minimum core must be fulfilled
for all before maximal needs are attended to) and instead advocates weighted priorities,
which require that, in instances where the minimum core cannot be fulfilled, the state
must provide justifications for such failure, and that such justifications must be sub-
jected to stringent scrutiny by the courts.
140 Id at 213.
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requirement that state programmes must be responsive to the urgent needs of
those in desperate situations espoused the idea, and the threshold, of the
minimum core approach.141 This can be gleaned from the Grootboom judg-
ment, where the court stated that an understanding of reasonableness
requires that the Bill of Rights be read as a whole because society values
human beings and wants to ensure that people are afforded their basic
human needs.142 In this context, the court held: "Itihose whose needs are
most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril,
must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving the realisation of
the right ... [T]he Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with
care and concern. If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to
respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the
test."1 43 The court proceeded to state that human beings must be treated as
human beings, failing which the constitution is worth infinitely less than
the paper on which it is written.'4 This link portrays the possibilities of mutu-
ality and interrelatedness of the minimum core and the reasonableness
approaches that the SACC prefers when adjudicating SERs.
145
The espousal of the minimum core approach in Colombia
The refusal of the SACC to take into account the minimum core approach in
the realisation of SERs is, however, not representative of the practice of other
national jurisdictions with entrenched SERs in their constitutions. A whole-
hearted espousal of the minimum core approach in understanding, imple-
menting and enforcing SER obligations can be seen in national practice in
141 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication, above at note 65 at 153; C Steinberg
"Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa's socio-economic rights
jurisprudence" (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 264 at 280; McLean Constitutional
Deference, above at note 135 at 182-83; R Dixon "Creating dialogue about socio-economic
rights: Strong v weak form judicial review revisited" (2007) 5 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 391 at 416; D Bilchitz "Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The mini-
mum core and its importance" (2002) 118 South African Law Journal 484 at 498-99;
Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights, above at note 39 at 140-42. Bilchitz argues (at
144-46) that the Grootboom court would not have reached the decision it did without
consideration of some level of minimum core, and undertakes an analysis to prove
this point. To support this, he quotes from the Grootboom judgment at para 44 where
the court held: "A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are pro-
vided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality." He
concludes (at 147-49) that, in adopting this reasoning, the court adopted the conception
of "dignity as integrity" a conception of dignity which supports the adoption of the mini-
mum core content of SERs.
142 Grootboom, para 44.
143 Ibid.
144 Id, para 83.
145 See Young Constituting Economic and Social Rights, above at note 45 at 84-85, where she
affirms that the SACC has chosen to place the minimum core under the general purview
of the reasonableness approach and uses it as one of the factors to assess the reasonable-
ness of the state's measures aimed at the realisation of SERs.
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domestic jurisdictions, as espoused by the Constitutional Court in Colombia
(CCC),146 a country with a similar constitutional clause incorporating inter-
national human rights law from ratified treaties into the national jurisdiction
as part of national law.147 The court's commitment to the minimum core
approach has been exemplified by its development of the concept of "the
minimum conditions for dignified life" or "the right to a vital minimum", a
concept constructed from the principle of the social state as entrenched in
the constitution as well as the rights to life, human dignity, health, work
and social security.14 8 The right to a vital minimum gave citizens an entitle-
ment to the satisfaction of at least the minimum social needs to enable
them to have dignified lives.149 The concept of the vital minimum has been
key in responding to the socio-economic needs of the poor and vulnerable
groups in Colombia, as it has served two important purposes: it determined
that SERs in the constitution were sufficiently linked with the other "funda-
mental" rights in the constitution to the point that they could be enforced
via the tutela;150 and it established a vision of SERs focussed on groups with
the most pressing needs and demanded the prioritization of government
resources for the amelioration of these needs.1 51 It thus required the state
to prioritize its expenditure towards ensuring that all citizens have access to
minimum levels of food, clothing and housing, which affected citizens
could move the court to enforce through the tutela.
This approach has been used in individual cases, such as a case on the right
to health, in a situation of 22 tutela actions dealing with a systematic violation
146 See id at 196-98, where Young contends that, due to the "social State rule of law" vision
of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, the CCC has not understood its role in relation to
the separation of powers doctrine, but in terms of a substantive constitutional vision of
the normative importance of rights and the special role that the constitution accords
judicial officers in enhancing the realisation of rights.
147 Chowdhury "Judicial adherence", above at note 42 at 7-8, affirms that the CCC has
adopted and uses the minimum core approach as expounded by the CESCR. He cites
some of the cases dealing with housing and health where the court has categorically
applied the minimum core content approach, including: CCC decision, T-859, 2003;
CCC decision, T-025, 2004; and CCC decision, T-585, 2006.
148 M Sepulveda "The Constitutional Court's role in addressing social injustice" in
M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and
Comparative Law (2009, Cambridge University Press) 144 at 148.
149 D Landau "The promise of a minimum core approach: The Colombian model for judicial
review of austerity measures" in A Nolan (ed) Economic and Social Rights after the Global
Financial Crisis (2014, Cambridge University Press) 267 at 270.
150 A tutela is an innovative writ of protection of fundamental rights enshrined in art 86 of
the Colombian Constitution; it can be filed by any person whose fundamental rights are
threatened or violated and requires immediate protection. It entails a summary proceed-
ing with the judge obliged to provide a resolution within ten days of a writ being fied.
See Sepulveda "The Constitutional Court's role", above at note 148 at 146.
151 D Landau "The reality of social rights enforcement" (2012) 53 Harvard International Law
Journal 401 at 420.
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of the right to health in Colombia.52 The court, adopting the right to health
framework expounded by the CESCR in General Comment No 14, restructured
the entire Colombian health system by giving content to the right to health.
153
It distinguished essential minimum core aspects of the right to health, that
were immediately enforceable, from those aspects which were subject to pro-
gressive realisation taking into account available resources.5 4 The court thus
ordered the provision of specific health goods and services, such as the provi-
sion of viral load tests, anti-retroviral treatment for HIlV/AIDS and costly cancer
treatment, the implementation of which were resource intensive.
155
The espousal of the minimum core content approach by the court can also
be seen in an earlier case on the situation of internally displaced persons
(IDPs).156 One of the three main orders of the court was for the government
to guarantee the protection of survival-level content (essential core) of the
most basic rights, such as the right to food, education, healthcare, housing
and land within a stringent period of six months from the date of the deci-
sion.157 The adoption of the minimum core in this case led to an improve-
ment in access to education and healthcare for the IDPs, with nearly 80 per
cent of them benefitting.158 In another case, concerning the validity of article
183 of Law 115 of 1994 that authorized public education institutions to
152 CCC Decision T-760 of 2008, discussed in MA Olaya "The right to health as a fundamental
and judicially enforceable right in Colombia" (2009) 10(4) ESR Review at 16-17, available
at: <http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic-joumals/esrrev/esrrev-vlO
n4_a6.pdf> (last accessed 13 June 2015); AE Yamin and OP Vera "How Do Courts Set
Health Policy? The case of the Colombian Constitutional Court" (17 February 2009) at
1-4, available at: <http://joumals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/joumal.
pmed.1000032> (last accessed 13 June 2015).
153 Yamin and Vera argue (id at 3) that, in adopting the health jurisprudence of the CESCR,
the court: (i) elaborated on the multiple dimensions of state obligations on the right to
health, and the importance of monitoring and oversight to enhance protection and
accountability; and (ii) reiterated the state's responsibility to adopt deliberate measures
to achieve progressive realisation and the impermissibility of retrogression, as well as the
importance of transparency, access to information and public participation in the real-
isation of the right to health.
154 Id at 3-4; Chowdhury "Judicial adherence", above at note 42 at 8; Olaya "The right to
health", above at note 152 at 16-17. Olaya's analysis of the court's minimum core rea-
soning indicates that the court acknowledged that: the tight to health has both positive
(which require resources to implement) and negative (which require state abstention)
obligations; enforceability of positive obligations (as the vital minimum) depended on
their urgency and the impact on human dignity of their non-implementation; and
non-implementation of positive obligations which did not have an adverse impact on
human dignity was subject to progressive realisation.
155 Yamin and Vera, id at 2.
156 Sentence T-025/04; this judgment was the outcome of the aggregation of 1,150 constitu-
tional complaints (tutelas) by IDPs.
157 C Rodriguez-Garavito "Beyond the courtroom: The impact of judicial activism on socio-
economic rights in Latin America" (2010-11) 89 Texas Law Review 1669 at 1682 and 1693.
158 Id at 1686. He remarks however (at 1687) that, due to the high number of IDPs, with over
5 million IDPs in the last 25 years and 280,000 IDPs in 2010 alone, access to the other SERs
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implement charges for education, the court, taking into account international
human rights law as incorporated in Colombia's domestic jurisdiction
through articles 44, 67 and 93 of the constitution,5 9 held that a right to
free primary education was immediately enforceable.160
Manuel Cepeda-Espinoza, a former CCC judge, has defined the Colombian
system of protecting rights as "biting substantive progressiveness".1 6'
"Progressiveness" recognizes that: rights are not absolute, and must be devel-
oped and expanded within certain limitations; implementation of rights must
show advancement accompanied by proof of progress; and advancement
should show progressiveness towards the effective enjoyment of rights.162
The "substantiveness" of the approach is indicated by two phenomena: the
adoption of a fixed standard that substantively defines the scope and content
of rights (including the minimum core); and the court's ability to give a rem-
edy to individual petitioners while at the same time ordering structural rem-
edies to cover similarly situated people, a contrast to the South African
situation exemplified in Grootboom.163 The "biting" nature of the approach is
indicated by the extensive nature of the decisions as they impose government
expenditure on implementation, order administrative and policy changes,
and prompt regulatory action.
Though not a panacea for the realisation of SERs, the exemplary use of inter-
national law, the incorporation of minimum core standards in the adjudica-
tion of SERs, the definition of the substantive content of SERs and the
court's willingness to make substantive orders for the amelioration of the con-
ditions of poor and marginalized groups in society as exemplified by the CCC's
jurisprudence, is a good example for Kenyan courts to follow in SER litigation.
Adopting such an approach will ensure that the entrenched SERs have a prac-
tical impact on the lives of poor and marginalized individuals and groups in
Kenya, the section of society that most requires the realisation of SERs.
contd
has been unsatisfactory, with 98% of IDPs living in poverty and only 5.5% having
adequate housing.
159 See amicus brief to case C-376/10 of 2010, prepared by The Cornell International Human
Rights Clinic, Robert F Kennedy Centre for Justice and Human Rights, and Association
NOMADESC (November 2009) at 1, available at: <http://www.escr-net.org/usr-
doc/Amicus-Brief-w-Annexes-Report-ENG-FINAL.pdf> (last accessed 6 April 2012).
160 See CCC decision C-376/10, available at: <http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/caselaw show.
htmdocid=1407210> (last accessed 6 April 2012).
161 MJ Cepeda-Espinoza "Transcript: Social and economic rights and the Colombian
Constitutional Court" (2010-11) 89 Texas Law Review 1699 at 1702-03.
162 Ibid. Transparent rights-based rationality, which requires the state to define objectives,
rationalize means to objectives, develop policies and regulations aimed at the fufilment
of objectives and to build institutional capacity to enhance the achievement of objec-
tives, can also be said to form part of the substantive aspect of the approach.
163 Id at 1703.
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CONCLUSION
Poverty, inequality and socio-economic marginalization have plagued Kenya
for a long time, with Kenya recording high poverty and inequality levels as
compared to most states within the African region. These challenges led to
the fight for a new constitutional dispensation aimed at enhancing human
dignity, ensuring substantive equality and lifting living standards of the
Kenyan people. Advocacy for a new constitution culminated in the promulga-
tion of a new constitution in August 2010, which entrenched justiciable SERs
as a vehicle for improving the living conditions of the poor, vulnerable and
marginalized individuals and groups in the country. The mere entrenchment
of these rights into a constitution as paper rights is, however, not sufficient;
there is still need for their effective as well as scrupulous implementation to
improve the practical socio-economic situation of the target groups.
This article has proposed the adoption of the minimum core approach by
both the political and the judicial organs of the state in the realisation of
SERs so as to enhance the conditions of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized
groups, with the aim of achieving the transformative aspirations of the 2010
Constitution. It has submitted that the direct espousal of international law
in the Kenyan domestic legal system as per article 2(5) and (6) of the 2010
Constitution requires that Kenya adopt the minimum core approach in
good faith in line with its commitments under international law. The article
has further argued that the adoption of the minimum core approach is sup-
ported by several provisions of the 2010 Constitution, especially: article 20(2)
that provides for the enjoyment of rights in the constitution to the greatest
extent consistent with the nature of the rights; articles 20(3)(b) and 259(1)
that call for the adoption of an interpretation that most favours the enforce-
ment of rights; and articles 20(5)(b) and 21(3) that require the prioritization
of the needs of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in society. It
is submitted that the adoption of the minimum core approach as per these
constitutional provisions will enhance the realisation of the purpose for
which the rights, especially the SERs, were entrenched in the constitution,
which, as per article 19(2), is to preserve the dignity of individuals and commu-
nities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all
human beings.
